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Abstract
To understand the reality of the West Bank industry and several of its 
main obstacles, it is impossible to neglect the influence of past political 
events. In fact, the recent changes of the Palestinian geopolitical context 
have been causing direct impacts on the Palestinian economy in general 
and on the industrial sector in particular. One of the most relevant recent 
political events that influenced the evolution of the Palestinian society and 
economy is related to Oslo Accords signed in 1993, which has created the 
conditions for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. The main 
objective of this article is precisely to evaluate how the new political 
conditions achieved with the creation of the Palestinian Authority have 
impacted the West Bank industrial development, in a sequence of three 
distinct phases: the first phase is from 1994 to 2000 matched with the 
beginning of the Palestinian Authority, and goes until the onset of the Al-
Aqsa Intifada. The second phase is from 2000 to 2004 matched with the 
Al-Aqsa Intifada (or Second Intifada); and the third phase from 2004 until 
the present time, started with the stability achieved after Al-Aqsa Intifada. 
Methodologically, this study is based on a historical approach crossed with 
a statistical and cartographic analysis of data from the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics. The results demonstrate how erratic is the evolution of 
the West Bank industrial sector during this period, and that almost 25 years 
of the emergence of the Palestinian Authority, the weakness of the West 
Bank industrial sector still persist, in part as a consequence of external 
forces, namely all the impositions done by Israel to limit the sovereignty of 
the Palestinian Authority to control its territory and economy.
Key-words: Oslo Accords; Palestinian Authority; Economic Geography; 
Industry; Palestine; West Bank.
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تقييم دور اتفاقات أوسلو على الصناعة في الضفة الغربية: 
تحليل اقتصادي للفترة 4991 – 6102
ملخص
لفهم واقع صناعة الضفة الغربية وتفسير العديد من العقبات الرئيسة الناتجة عن تأثير 
الأحداث  السياسية  الماضية  التي  أدت  إلى  تغييرات  في  السياق  الجيوسياسي  الفلسطيني 
تسببت في آثار مباشرة على الاقتصاد الفلسطيني بعامة وعلى القطاع الصناعي بخاصة 
إن أحد أهم الأحداث السياسية الأخيرة التي أثرت على تطور المجتمع الفلسطيني والاقتصاد 
الفلسطيني  مرتبط  باتفاقات  أوسلو  التي  تم  التوقيع  عليها  في  عام3991  والتي  أوجدت 
الظروف  اللازمة لإنشاء  السلطة  الفلسطينية. والهدف  الرئيس من هذه  الدراسة هو  تقييم 
كيفية  تأثير  الظروف  السياسية  الجديدة  التي  تحققت  مع  إنشاء  السلطة  الفلسطينية  على 
التنمية الصناعية للضفة الغربية، في ثلاث مراحل متميزة: المرحلة الأولى من بداية السلطة 
الفلسطينية،  وحتى  بداية  انتفاضة  الأقصى  (4991  إلى  عام  0002)،والمرحلة  الثانية 
انتفاضة الأقصى (الانتفاضة الثانيةمن عام 0002 إلى عام 4002).والمرحلة الثالثة من 
عام 4002 وحتى الوقت الحاضر، مع الاستقرار الذي تحقق بعد انتفاضة الأقصى.
من الناحية المنهجية، اعتمدت هذه الدراسة على المنهج التاريخي و المنهج الإحصائي 
التحليلي ورسم الخرائط مستندة إلى بيانات الجهاز المركزي للإحصاء الفلسطيني. وتظهر 
النتائج مدى عدم انتظام تطور القطاع الصناعي في الضفة الغربية في هذه الفترة، وبعد 
مرور ما يقرب 52 عاما على تأسيس السلطة الفلسطينية، لا يزال ضعف القطاع الصناعي 
في الضفة الغربية مستمرا، وذلك نتيجة للقوى الخارجية ، وهي جميع القيود التي تفرضها 
إسرائيل للحد من سيادة السلطة الفلسطينية على أراضيها واقتصادها.
الكلمات المفتاحية: اتفاقات أوسلو؛ السلطة الفلسطينية؛ الجغرافيا الاقتصادية؛ صناعة؛ 
فلسطين؛ الضفة الغربية.
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1. Introduction
The signing of the Oslo Accords, a peace-treaty promoted by the United 
Nations in 1993 between the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and 
Israel, led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, which 
received administrative tasks and responsibilities on limited geographical 
regions of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967(Naqib, 2003; Meckla, 
2014). At that time, it was established the foundations for the beginning of a 
new development stage of Palestinian society and economy. Nevertheless, 
following Oslo Accords, the Palestinian economy in general and the industrial 
sector in particular are still operating under difficult conditions, due to the 
Israeli decision of limiting the responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority in 
the control its economy (Aburaida, 2017). Even so, the Palestinian Authority 
has been doing, since 1994, some efforts to help the development of its 
industrial firms, by providing supporting institutions (Palestinian Ministry of 
National Economy – MNE; Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency – PIPA; 
Palestine Standards Institute – PSI; Palestinian Industrial Estates and Free 
Zones Authority - PIEFZA) and better conditions to perform their missions, 
through the establishment of several international trade agreements: Free 
Trade Agreement with Egypt -signed in 1994; Declaration of Free Trade 
between the USA and West Bank and Gaza Strip – signed in 1996; Adhesion 
to the Greater Arab Free Trade Area – signed in 1997; Interim Agreement 
on Trade and Cooperation with the European Union – signed in 1997; Free 
Trade Agreement with Jordan – signed in 1998; Interim Agreement with 
EFTA States – signed in 1998; Agreement on Commercial Cooperation 
between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Russia – signed in 
1998; Framework on Economic Cooperation and Trade between Palestine 
and Canada – signed in 1999; Interim Agreement on Trade with Turkey – 
signed in 2004; Agadir Agreement – signed in 2004; Free Trade Agreement 
with MERCOSUR – signed in 2011 (PALTRADE, 2016). Despite all efforts to 
establish these international trade agreements, Israel is in full control over 
Palestinian trade movements as importing and exporting products to and 
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from the Palestinian market is done through Israeli ports, or by borders 
controlled by Israel, forcing those exchanged goods to be subjected to Israeli 
standards and regulations. This circumstance causes impediments on 
movement of goods and discrimination against Palestinian products in the 
Israeli ports, resulting in a minimal utilization of these trade agreements.
Moreover, to promote the Palestinian industry development, the Palestinian 
Authority has been working as well on empowering both the role of general 
and sectorial industrial associations (Palestinian Federation of Industries – 
PFI; Palestine Trade Centre – PalTrade; Federation of Palestinian Chambers 
of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture – FPCCIA; Palestinian Businessmen’s 
Association), and also working on the improvement of the business legal 
framework. In this regard, the Palestinian Authority issued a number of 
acts and laws to regulate investments and ease the movement of capitals in 
order to attract industrial investments, such as the Investment Promotion 
Law in 1998.The Investment Promotion Law regulates the process of 
granting incentives for investments in order to attract new industrial 
investments (PIPA, 1998), despite being target towards supporting the 
relatively large investments. As well as other laws, as the one that aims at 
providing advanced services to local and foreign investors to facilitate the 
communication process between the private sector and government, by the 
‘Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency’. 
Furthermore, the Palestinian Authority has managed to rate four industrial 
zones (created with the help of foreign donations) as priority zones for 
industrial development: the Jenin industrial zone planned with the help of the 
German government (from KFW - German government owned development 
bank); the Tarqumia industrial zone planned with the help of the Turkish 
government;  the Bethlehem industrial zone planned with the help of the 
French government; and the special Jericho agricultural zone to help the 
agro-food industry and planned with the help of the Japanese government 
(PFI-USAID, 2009). To facilitate the investment in those zones, it has been 
recently launched the division ‘One Stop Service - OSS’, dedicated to offer 
9
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integrated support for investors to start their businesses in industrial areas, 
providing them simple, fast, precise, and accountable licensing and non-
licensing services (PIEFZA, 2014; Salah, 2015).However, with the exception 
of the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park, there is still not much progress on 
the ground on the application of these investments, as two of these four 
industrial zones are still just proposals (PFI-USAID, 2009). The Jericho Agro-
Industrial Park aims at organizing the Palestinian agro-industrial sector in 
Jericho and Jordan valley. It was planned with the help of the Japanese 
government initiative ‘The Corridor for Peace and Prosperity’ and it aims at 
generating 5000 direct or indirect jobs. Until 2015 it received 26 industrial 
units with a total employment of 583 workers (PIEFZA, 2015).
Despite all these efforts exerted for the advancement of the Palestinian 
industrial sector, the progress is still humble, insufficient and the industrial 
sector not achieved the desired modernization level. This paper intends to 
evaluate how the new political conditions achieved with the Oslo Accords have 
impacted the West Bank industrial development. After a brief presentation 
of the West Bank economic geography evolution during this period (1994-
2016), it will be discussed how the recent geopolitical evolution of Palestine 
has influenced the West Bank industrial development in a sequence of three 
distinct phases: the first phase from 1994 to 2000 match with the beginning 
of the Palestinian Authority and goes until the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada; 
the second phase from 2000 to 2004 match with the Al-Aqsa Intifada (or 
Second Intifada); and the third phase from 2004 until the present time, 
started with the stability achieved after the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
1110
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Problem of the study 
Despite the Oslo Accords of 1993 have created the conditions for the 
establishment of the Palestinian Authority (Naqib, 2003), the Israeli 
occupation is still a reality in all West Bank, even in those territories where 
the Palestinian Authority was supposed to have a fully administrative control 
(PCHR, 2016). This external influence is responsible for several obstacles to 
the West Bank industrial development and growth. Under the framework of 
this continuous occupation, Israel turned the West Bank into both a source 
of cheap workforce to Israel economy and a successful trade arena for its 
products (Aburaida, 2017). In addition, Israel imposed major constraints on 
Palestinian economic activities, specifically the industrial ones, which are 
still nowadays retracting its growth and competitiveness (Epstein, 2002). In 
fact, the data presented by MAS (2013) in a study entitled “The Palestinian 
Economy After 20 years of Oslo Accords”, indicated that the share of the 
industrial sector contribution to the Palestinian GDP declined from 22.3% in 
1994 to become less than 12% at the end of 2012. In opposition, the share of 
services sector rose from 25% in 1994 to 58% at the end of 2012. According 
to Rantisi (2016), this evolution was responsible for a huge increase in the 
Palestinian trade deficit, as in 2014 the Palestinians exports to international 
markets amounted to 943 million dollars and Palestinian imports amounted 
to around 5.7 billion dollars. All these figures demonstrate the difficulties 
currently faced by a shrinking industrial sector, that has been progressively 
losing its relevance in the Palestinian society.
The low dynamic of this industrial sector, mainly composed by traditional 
and small-sized businesses, is also proven by its restriction to the local 
market and its failure to export and to attract foreign direct investment (El-
Jafari, 2016). Meanwhile, the data from the Palestinian labor force surveys 
(PCBS, 1996, 2015-a), indicates the increase in the unemployment rate from 
13.9% in 1995 to 25.9% in 2015, and in this context it has been advocated 
that the industrial sector development could contribute to solve this social 
problem, as the Palestinian industrial sector is working at 50% of production 
11
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capacity and in a scenario of increasing its production capacity to 70%, that 
would create about 40 thousand new jobs (Attiyani, 2016).
Research Questions 
To understand the reality of the West Bank industry and several of its 
main obstacles, it is impossible to neglect the influence of past political 
events, as recent changes of the Palestinian geopolitical context have been 
causing direct impacts on the Palestinian economy in general and on the 
industrial sector in particular.  Under this framework this study has two 
main research questions:
 – How do the new political conditions (Oslo Accords) influence the recent 
evolution of the West Bank economic geography during the 19942016- 
period?
 – How does the recent geopolitical evolution of Palestine influence the 
West Bank industrial development in the same period: 19942016-?
Methodological Approach
Methodologically, this study is based in a statistic and cartographic analysis, 
mostly grounded on data published by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics, that carried out a series of industrial surveys in the West Bank 
since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Unfortunately there 
are some limitations in the use of these databases, which results from a 
clear inconsistency in the official surveys used over this period. Therefore, 
the following analysis is dependent on the available indicators. For instance, 
the total number of employees is not available by economic branches for 
each West Bank Governorates, which avoid any attempt of calculating the 
economic specialization index for the West Bank Governorates. Besides, 
the indicators are not available for all variables for the same years, so the 
comparative analysis presented in this study is not always for the same exact 
period.Moreover, this research privileges an historical approach, as it is not 
possible to understand and the current challenges faced nowadays by the 
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industry in the West Bank, without taking into consideration the influence of 
some past events that occurred during last decades. Historical events which 
have had tremendous implications on the Palestinian geopolitical evolution, 
and consequently in the way that nowadays industrial activities based on 
the West Bank work and the constraints that affect their performance and 
competitiveness.
2. The recent evolution of the West Bank economic geography: 
1994: 2016
According to the statistical data published by the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics, after 1994,the Palestinian economy has become a 
majority based on the services sector, as it represented in 2015 almost 23/ 
of all Palestine employment (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Evolution of West Bank employment by economic activity 1996-
2015  
Source: data from PCBS (1997, 2016)
The figures about the evolution of employment by economic activity, 
between 1996 and 2015, indicate that after the signing of the Oslo Accords, the 
Palestinian economy has clearly become more based at the service sectors, 
at the expense of a transference of workers from the other two productive 
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sectors: the secondary activity sector (industry, energy production and 
construction) has passed from 36% of all the Palestinian employment in 1996 
to 28% in 2015; and the primary sector  (agriculture, animal production and 
forestry activities) has evolved from 16,2% of all the Palestinian employment 
in 1996 to 9,6% in 2015. It is true that the tertiarization of the economy is 
a global and desired/inevitable trend (UN-DESA, 2013), that expresses the 
service sector expansion as a consequence of the personal and household 
consumption increase, as well as driven by economic activities services 
consumption, helping them to get more added value in their business. 
However, in Palestine, the problem of this economic evolution is that the 
reduce of employment in those two sectors (primary and secondary sectors) 
is not so related with the effects of the mechanization/informatization of their 
productive processes, or with the effects of evolving to low labour intensity 
and high tech activities with more added value (both trends releasing workers 
for other emergent activities in the tertiary sector). In fact this local trend is a 
more worrying consequence from the continuous confiscation of Palestinian 
land by Israel, particularly during First and Second Intifada, and also from 
a problematic loss of local competitiveness, preventing the opening of new 
businesses and in some cases forcing the bankruptcy and the closure of 
many of already existing companies (Aburaida, 2017).
Geographically, this tertiarization trend of Palestinian economy is 
affecting almost of all West Bank territory. Analyzing the changes that 
have occurred in the distribution of workers between 1997 and 2016, 
there is evidence of a diversity decrease in the economic specialization of 
West Bank governorates (Figure 2). In 1997, there were governorates with 
an employment specialization in activities from each of the 3 economic 
sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary), particularly in four distinct 
economic branches (4 governorates with more employees in the services 
activities, 2 governorates were the majority of workers were employed in 
the primary sector activities, 1 governorate specialized in the economic 
branch related with mining, quarrying and manufacturing activities, and 1 
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with more employment in the commerce, hotels and restaurants activities). 
Two decades later, in 2016, almost all governorates have their higher 
proportion of employment in the services activities, with the only exception 
of Jerusalem governorate where the majority of their workers are employed 
by companies related with construction activities. 
The expansion of construction activities in Jerusalem Governorate is a 
direct result of the Judaization of Jerusalem. The first Israeli colony was built 
inside the Old City of Jerusalem immediately after the 1967 Six Days War, 
and during the years of occupation Israeli colonies have greatly expanded 
within the borders of the Jerusalem Municipality and the surrounding areas. 
This Israeli policy has continued in the Palestinian Authority period and it 
was specially intensified after the Second Intifada, which has promoted 
the local construction activities. Nowadays, there are a total of 19 Israeli 
colonies in the Jerusalem Governorate (18 within the municipal boundaries 
of Jerusalem) and Israel still intends to expand these colonies (ARIJ, 2015). 
Figure 2. Employment specialization by West Bank governorates 19962015-
Source: author’s elaboration with data from PCBS (1997, 2016)
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The more relevant changes in the economic geography of West Bank 
were especially felt in the North, were 2 governorates (Jenin & Tubas and 
Tulkarem&Qalqiliya) have evolved directly from primary sector activities 
to the tertiary sector, between 1996 and 2015. However, this was not a 
consequence of the dynamism of the services activities, but above all 
a result of the agriculture weakening trend, for reasons related with 
political options taken by Israel in the previous period of occupation. It is 
also relevant to observe that in 1996 there was one governorate in the 
North (Nablus &Salfit) that was specialized in the ‘mining, and quarrying 
and manufacturing’ activities, and it has lost this specialization in the last 
20 years to the services activities. Other loss of diversity in the economic 
geography of West Bank happened in Jerusalem governorate, that in 1996 
had the majority of their jobs related with its worldwide religious tourism 
advantage (most of their jobs were in services related with commerce, 
hotels and restaurants), but surprisingly it has lost the ability to explore this 
unique advantage over the last two decades. 
In order to get a deeper analysis of the evolution of the West Bank 
economic geography during this period, it is possible to focus our analysis 
by each economic branch (Table 1).  The agriculture sector has witnessed a 
significant decline in all governorates during the period of 1996 -2015, except 
for Bethlehem & Jericho which has witnessed an increase in the proportion 
of workers in the agricultural sector, as its employment increased from 
14% to 18%. This is in part a consequence of the Jericho Agro-Industrial 
Park, which has intensified local agriculture production to supply these new 
investments in the agro-food industry. Besides, it also comes as a result of 
an increased demand by the domestic market for agricultural products, as 
well as some exportations, especially after the trade agreements between 
the Palestinian Authority and Israel and the Arab countries (Al-Sayeh, 2015).
1716
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Table 1. Evolution of the employment proportion (%) by each West Bank 


















































































1996 14.4 20.9 20.2 18.2 5.3 21 100%
2015 8.7 18.7 22.4 22.1 5.3 22.8 100%
 Bethlehemand
Jericho 
1996 14.3 18.3 18.8 16.3 3.6 28.7 100%
2015 18.0 13.5 12.8 18.8 3.6 33.3 100%
Jerusalem
 
1996 0.7 14.8 17.3 29.9 10.1 27.2 100%
2015 0.8 12.4 32.0 24.5 6.7 23.6 100%
Ramallah
 
1996 10.2 16.6 26.4 15.4 3.9 27.5 100%




1996 13.5 24.3 13.1 20.2 4.7 24.2 100%
2015 5.5 19.3 21.4 17.3 5.5 31.0 100%
 Tulkaremand
Qalqiliya 
1996 26.2 15.4 16.8 15 4.5 22.1 100%




1996 31.6 9.9 16.2 16.6 4.1 21.6 100%
2015 26.1 9.8 14 17.5 4.2 28.4 100%
The proportion of the Governorate employment in this economic branch 
has increased 
The proportion of the Governorate employment in this economic branch 
has decreased
The proportion of the Governorate employment in this economic branch 
was stable
Source: data from PCBS (1997, 2016)
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The ‘mining, quarying and manufacturing’ activities have witnessed a 
decline in almost all of the governorates, with the only exception of Qalqiliya 
and Tulkarem where the employment rate had just a slight increase from 
15.4% to 16.5%. It is important to highlight that Nablus & Salfit remain in 
2015 (as it was in 1996), the West Bank governorate where we can find a 
higher proportion of employment in this economic branch (almost 15/ of its 
employment). In second position comes Hebron with 18,7%. Jenin & Tubas 
is the least relevant in these activities, employing less than 10% of all its 
workers, and this proportion has been stable over the last two decades.
The construction sector employment has faced a transition between 
two governorates. In 1996 Ramallah & Al-Bireha concentrated more on 
construction workers than any other West Bank governorate (26,4% of total 
employment), as a consequence of the concentration in this governorate, 
after Oslo Agreement, of the majority of public services related with the 
creation of the Palestinian National Authority. However, in 2015, it has 
lost that specialization in favor of Jerusalem governorate, where almost 
132%)  3/) of their workers are related with construction activities, most 
of them involved in the construction of the new Israeli colonies created in 
Jerusalem governorate after the Second Intifada (the wages in construction 
activities in Jerusalem governorate are higher than in any other West Bank 
governorate).  The increase in the proportion of the construction employment 
in Jerusalem had happened simultaneously with a decrease in all other 
economic branches in this governorate, including the tertiary activities. 
The employment in commerce, hotels and restaurants has increased 
in most of the governorates, except for Nablus, Salfit and Jerusalem. The 
transport, storage and communication activities have a minor relevance 
in all West Bank governorates, the one where is more present is in the 
Jerusalem governorate employing only 6,7% of total workers, and this rate 
decreased from 1996 where it was above 10%. The other services (public 
services, services to firms, real estate activities and financial activities) 
have witnessed the most dramatic changes with the biggest increase in the 
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employment rate at the expense of the other economic branches. Almost 
all of the governorates have experienced an increase in the proportion of 
workers in this sector, except for Jerusalem which have actually witnessed 
a decline. Ramallah & Al-Bireh are the more important governorate in these 
activities (more than 40% of Ramallah employment is in these services). 
Ramallah became the administrative capital of the Palestinian Authority, 
which led to the concentration of all official governmental institutions and 
the big health and educational institutions, as well as the main private sector 
institutions related with finance, insurance, consultancy and other business 
services (Abu Hawa, 2014).
Focusing exclusively in the industrial sector and regarding the evolution 
of the industrial establishments between 1994 and 2012, we can notice that 
the number of manufacturing activities has increased from 7185 in 1994 to 
12657 in 2012, i.e. around 5472 new industrial units have been established 
during this period with an average annual growth rate of 3,2%. However, 
it will be explained in the following sections this increase trend was not 
regular during this period. 
A global analysis of the industrial establishments evolution, shows that 
Hebron in the south came as the most dynamic governorate in terms of the 
creation of manufacturing activities between 1994 and 2012 (PCBS, 1996, 
2013-a), with 1415 new units, followed in the north by Jenin & Tubas (more 
953 units) and Nablus & Salfit (more 789 units).  Tulkarm and Qalqiliya (near 
the border with Israel) and Jericho (near the border with Jordan) where 
only 41 new units were created, where the West Bank governorates less 
dynamics in the creation of new manufacturing activities.  
Analyzing the manufacturing activity is more relevant in each governorate 
in terms of the total number of firms (Figure 3). It is visible a relevant 
change between 1994, prior to the creation of the Palestinian Authority, and 
2012. When the Palestinian Authority was created in 1994, it was visible 
a more diversified pattern, with six manufacturing activities dominating 
the industrial sector of West Bank governorates. From 1994 to 2012 it 
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was witnessed a concentration of the West Bank governorates in just 3 
manufacturing activities (which is a sign that suggests an evolution for an 
industrial profile less diversified): ‘metal products manufacturing, except 
machinery and equipment’; ‘wood products and furniture manufacturing’; 
and ‘’foods and beverages manufacturing’.
Figure 3. Evolution of the main manufacturing activity by governorate in 
terms of the number of firms: 1994 and 2012
 Source: data from PCBS (1996, 2013-a) 
‘Metal products manufacturing, except machinery and equipment’ is the 
activity that dominates in 2012 the industrial sector of more governorates 
-four-: in Qalqiliya and Jericho that was already the reality in 1994, but in case 
of Hebron it has changed its specialization from ‘leather goods & accessories 
manufacturing’ and in Ramallah it has changed from ‘wood products and 
furniture manufacturing’.‘Wood products and furniture manufacturing’ 
dominates in 2012 the industrial sector of three governorates: in Jerusalem 
that was already the reality in 1994, but in case of Bethlahem it has changed 
its specialization from ‘rubber and plastic products & other non metallic 
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mineral products manufacturing’ and in Nablus &Salfit it has changed 
from ‘textiles &apparel manufacturing’. And finally ‘Foods and beverages 
manufacturing’ dominates in 2012 the industrial sector of two governorates: 
in Tulkarm that was already the reality in 1994, but in the case of Jenin & 
Tubas, it has changed its specialization from ‘metal products manufacturing, 
except machinery and equipment’.
3. The recent geopolitical evolution and its impact in the West Bank 
industrial development.
The West Bank manufacturing activities have increased from 7185 in 
1994 to 12657 in 2012. However this increase trend was not regular over 
these years. So, on the next pages it will be presented the evolution of the 
West Bank industrial activities during the Palestinian Authority period, in a 
sequence of three distinct phases: the first is from 1994 to 2000 matching 
with the beginning of the Palestinian Authority and goes until the onset of 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada; the second is from 2000 to 2004 match with the Al-
Aqsa Intifada (or Second Intifada); and the third phase begun in 2005 and 
started with the stability achieved after the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
3.1. The first phase: 19942000- (Oslo Accords – beginning of Al-Aqsa 
Intifada)
In the beginning of this phase the West Bank industrial structure was 
dominated by the metal products manufacturing (except machinery and 
equipments), the food industry, and the clothing and textile industry, who 
have acquired the highest percentages in the total number of West Bank 
manufacturing activities. In 1994 their percentages reached 21,8%, 16,1% 
and 15,8% respectively (PCBS, 1996). These industries were concentrated 
mostly in Nablus (Figure 4), where the number of factories was 2063 in 
1994, representing about 28,6% of total industrial activities in the West 
Bank (it is important to highlight that Nablus governorate in that period 
administratively comprised Salfit).
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Figure 4. The geographical distribution of manufacturing industries in 1994
Source: data from PCBS (1996)
Regarding the geographical distribution of industrial firms in the 
West Bank; in the beginning of the Palestinian Authority period, Hebron 
governorate comes in second place, where the number of factories reached 
1618 factories and accounted for about 22.5% of the total number of 
factories in the West Bank. While the less industrialized governorates were 
Jerusalem (6,5%), Qalqilya (3,1%), and specially Jericho where the industrial 
establishments did not exceed 0,9%.
From 1994 to 2000, the number of industrial establishments evolved from 
7185 to 11509 (an increase of 60%). The industrial sector has witnessed 
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a rapid development since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority 
after the signing of the Oslo Accord. From the beginning of this self-ruled 
period, the Palestinian Authority has prepared several plans and programs 
aiming at the development of the Palestinian economic activity, including 
the activities of the industrial sector, in order to achieve high growth rates, 
and contribute to the overall development process. Palestinian Authority 
used the money of the Palestinian Investment Fund to the development of 
the industrial sector, namely providing financial guarantees for banks to be 
able to provide the necessary funds to small and medium industrial projects. 
Besides, it has started to establish several international trade agreements 
to encourage the Palestinian goods exportations, and it has launched the 
Investment Promotion Law to facilitate industrial investors projects. As a 
result of all those policies, the industrial sector’s contribution to GDP(gross 
domestic product) increased from 8% in 1993 to 16.8% in 1998, so the 
sector has achieved an increase rate of 50% during the course of five years 
(Hazboun&Bahiri, 1994).
Despite the positive evolution in the industrial sector contribution to the 
West Bank GDP over this first phase of the Palestinian Authority, the majority 
of studies and reports have shown the constant presence of structural 
defects, and the weakness of the overall performance of this economic 
sector (Makhol&Atyani, 2001; Abdul-Khaliq, 2004; Nasrallah&Awad, 2004; 
Surani, 2006; UNCTAD, 2011; World Bank, 2013). In fact, the ratio of external 
industrial sales declined in the West Bank from 20% in 1997 to 18% in 1999, 
which indicates the high dependence of the local market and the difficulties 
to conquest external markets (MAS, 2001). This evolution is mostly a 
consequence of the ‘Paris Economic Protocol’ signed in 1994, which is an 
economic agreement that was part of Oslo Accords, which is in view of some 
Palestinian economists the big mistake made by the Palestine Liberation 
Organization against the interest of the Palestinian economy, and accepted 
by the Palestinian Authority that did not demand its revision or negotiation on 
the following years (MAS, 2012; Shu’aybi, 2013). Unfair competition affecting 
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West Bank goods is a main obstacle to local firms, which was mainly caused 
by the Paris Economic Protocol that gave the opportunity for the Israeli 
products to invade the Palestinian market at the same time, it prevents 
many of the Palestinian products from entering the Israeli market.  Besides, 
the Paris Economic Protocol increased raw material prices with higher 
customs on raw materials imported from Israel and from other countries, 
which had a negative impact on the local industrial competitiveness.To deal 
with this loss of Palestinian products competitiveness in foreign markets, 
the Palestinian Authority did not have the needed funds, and mostly 
because Israel worked during its occupation on reducing the Palestinian 
financial resources in an organized and programmed manner, which was 
done through three basic channels; (1) through charging VAT (value added 
tax) on Palestinian imports from other countries, (2) the social security and 
income tax imposed on Palestinians working in Israel but still living in West 
Bank, (3) and the use of the Israeli currency in Palestine, also for import and 
export transactions, which is benefiting the Israeli economy. The estimated 
total of all these resources is found to be between 15% to 25% of the annual 
Palestinian GDP (Al-Naqib&Attiyani, 2003).
Even so, the Palestinian economy was characterized by its growth during 
the period from 1994 to 2000, as a result of the political stability achieved. 
The GDP increased at an annual rate of 11%, and the increase rate was in 
Gaza Strip about 12.2% and 10.8% in the West Bank (Aqumassan, 2005). 
3.2. The second phase: 20002004- (Al-Aqsa Intifada)
With the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, the Palestinian 
economy started to face difficult conditions. On one side as a consequence 
of a complete isolation that was imposed on both Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank (not only in the circulation of people but also in imports and exports), 
as Israel proceeded to the closure of all external borders of the Palestinian 
territories, including those with Israel. Furthermore, the invasion of the 
West Bank in 2002 resulted in the destruction of many buildings and 
factories (in pretext of security reasons) and led to the set-up of Israeli 
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checkpoints between towns and villages (World Bank, 2004). So, the decline 
in the industrial sector was inevitable, as those decisions created severe 
difficulties not only in the importation of raw materials from abroad through 
Israeli ports and borders, but also those decisions that cut the access to 
the foreign markets, and even brought huge difficulties in the access to the 
domestic market (a result of the checkpoints policy). Consequently, during 
the period correspondent with the Second Intifada, the number of industrial 
firms decreased from 11,509 in 2000 to 9,444 in 2004 (a decrease of 18% of 
the West Bank Industrial establishments); more than 2000 factories closed 
during this period of four years. This happened after a clear dynamic period 
of the first phase characterized by a growth in the number of factories, from 
7185 in 1994 to 11509 in 2000, even if most of them were micro and small 
in terms of the number of workers (Al-Taibi, 2001).
This decreasing trend was accompanied by the declining in the total the 
number of workers in industrial activites, as after an increase from 32,173 
in 1994 to 46,755 in 2000 (with an annual growth rate of 6,2%). It was 
registered during the Al-Aqsa Intifada a decrease in the number of workers 
in the industrial sector, from 46755 in 2000 to 38487 in 2004 (Figure 5). 
During the Al-Aqsa Intifada employment rate in the industrial sector dropped 
significantly from 16.4% in 1999 to 12.7% in 2004 as a direct result of the 
Israeli imposed isolation of the West Bank.
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Figure 5. The number of workers in the industrial sector in the West Bank 
during the period from 1994 to 2012
Source: data from PCBS (2000, 2013-b, 2015-a)
It is important to understand that according to PCBS (2000) the industrial 
employment increased in absolute values between 1994 and 2000, but not 
in relative values, as the employment rate in the industrial sector in 1995 
was about 18% of the total number of Palestinian workers and decreased in 
1999 to 16.4%. As a result of the higher dynamism of the services activities 
in jobs creation and also a consequence of the higher wages in Israel which 
led to the attraction of many Palestinian workers during this phase (which 
started to became unavailable to join the West Bank firms labourforce). On 
the next phase this scenario has completely changed because Israel has 
stopped hiring labour force from the West Bank, and has imposed limitations 
on the Palestinians, who already worked in Israel and in the Israeli colonies, 
decreasing from 25,9% of the West Bank employees in 1999 to 10,7% in 
2004 when Second Intifada ended PCBS (2000, 2006).
According to Alderaoi (2014) one of the reasons that help to explain why the 
industrial activity in the West Bank has clearly retracted during the Second 
Intifada, is in part related with the destruction, by offensive and devasting 
attacks, of more than 30% of the Palestinian factories during the Israeli 
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invasion of 2002, which has also caused partial damages on about 30% of the 
West Bank factories, causing the suspension (permanent or temporarily) of 
60% of the Palestinian industrial activities. Other reasons presented by the 
author are related with the complete isolation of West Bank and Gaza Strip 
in order for Israel to prevent supplies, production inputs and machinery and 
equipment from arriving to the remaining Palestinian factories, as well as 
a way to hamper their exports. A decision that prevented West Bank firms 
from benefiting of the conquests achieved in the previous phase (1994-2000), 
namely the opportunities to explore external markets by exportations, or from 
the foreign investments attracted to the local economy. According to World 
Bank (2003) after two years of Intifada the levels of investment and trade were 
all significantly lower, as the total of investment has fallen from about 1.45 
billion US$ in 1999 to 150 million US$ in 2002, a decline of about 90%. 
Besides the Palestinian per capita income felt by almost 40% during 
the first two years of the Second Intifada, which led to rising poverty and 
unemployment rate, which also contributed to explain the industrial activity 
retraction during the Second Intifada. The most affected industries were: 
food, textile, leather, and plastics industries. According to Kareem (2003), 
the West Bank industrial sector losses, from the beginning of the Second 
Intifada until the end of 2001, an amount around 540 million US dollars. 
About these losses, World Bank (2003) indicated that in the first two years 
of the Intifada, the Palestinian economy loss reached 7% of GDP, just from 
the effects caused in the industrial facilities that were operating before the 
attacks. 
With regard to Palestinian industrial exports, statistics show a decline in 
the value of exports after 2000 compared with that of 1999. The value of 
these exports dropped in 2001 by up to 37.3%, and continued to decline in 
2002 comparing with 1999, by 22.6%. The development of exports did not 
improve in 2003, while in 2004, there has been a relative improvement in 
the industrial export value compared to previous years, but it remained low 
by 19.9% in comparison to 1999 (PCBS, 2006).
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3.3. The third phase: after 2005 (after Al-Aqsa Intifada)
The Sharm el-Sheikn peace conference at 5th February 2005 sets the 
end of the Second Intifada (ILO, 2005), from this date started a new period, 
however,it’s important to bear in mind that the Israeli military checkpoints 
in West Bank cities and borders have been kept. During this new phase, the 
number of factories increased again, from 9444 in 2004 to 12657 in 2012, 
reversing the downward trend of the previous phase (overcoming the total 
of industrial firms that were operating in the West Bank just before the Al-
Aqsa Intifada: 11509 industrial units in 2000).
According to PCBS (2013-a), the most relevant industries in the West 
Bank in 2012, in number of firms, are ‘metal products manufacturing, 
except machinery and equipment’ with 2845 units, and ‘wood and furniture 
manufacturing’ with 2832 units. In global only these two activities are 
responsible for 44,9% of all manufacturing activities in the West Bank (Table 
2), and the governorate that concentrates more of these two activities is 
Hebron, followed by Nablus. In the third position, it is ranked the activities 
related with the ‘food and beverages manufacturing’ with 2174 units, 
which corresponds to 17,2% of total West Bank factories. In this case the 2 
governorates with more units are the same but in the inverse order, Nablus 
is the one that concentrate more of these manufacturing activities (21,8%), 
followed by Hebron (16,3%).
Only two more activities concentrate more than 10% of West Bank 
industrial units: the ‘rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic 
products’ with 14,2% and more concentrated in Hebron (31,6% of them are 
located in Hebron), and the ‘textiles and apparel manufacturing’ with 12,4% 
of all West Bank industries, and in this case, more concentrated in Nablus 
(26,7% of these activities are located in Nablus). From a list of 11 different 
manufacturing activities, six concentrate less than 4% of the total West 
Bank industries (PCBS, 2013-a).
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Its possible to conclude that the structure of the West Bank manufacturing 
activities is not only characterized by its reduced diversity (just 3 in 11 
groups of activities concentrated almost 2/3 of all firms -62,1%-), but 
also characterized by low tech activities with low added value. In fact, 
those activities with more knowledge intensity, present in countries with 
a more modern and qualified industry, are almost absent in this territory, 
as only 0,2% of West Bank industries are ‘computer, electronics, optical 
and electric equipments products manufacturing’, 1% are ‘chemicals and 
basic pharmaceutical products’, and even just 4% are ‘manufacturing of 
machinery/equipments’.
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There is no available data about the absolute values of employment by 
governorate and manufacturing activity, so it is not possible to calculate the 
regional specialization indexes. Even so, and considering only the distribution 
of firms, it is possible to suggest the strongest regional specializations in 
the West Bank are in the ‘leather goods and accessories manufacturing’ 
with 86,2% of these activities located in just Hebron governorate, and also 
in the ‘tobacco products manufacturing’ with 54,5% in Jenin Governorate 
(84% considering Jenin and Tubas together, as they are neighbouring 
governorates).
In terms of its geographical distribution, the West Bank manufacturing 
activities were in 2012 mainly concentrated in Hebron in the south and 
Nablus in the north (Figure 6). The number of factories in Hebron reached 
3033, which represents almost ¼ (24%) of all West Bank industries. In 
Nablus governorate are located almost 1/5 (19,4%) of the total of industries 
in the West Bank – 2452 units-, which represents a decrease in comparison 
with Nablus proportion in 1994 (26%), but the reason to this decrease is the 
administrative amendments made by the Palestinian Authority in the mid-
nineties of the last century which resulted in the separation of Salfit from 
Nablus governorate. 
On the second level and still with more than 1000 industrial firms are 
four governorates: Ramallah & Al-Bireh with 1473 units (11,6%); Jenin with 
1336 (10,6%); Bethlehem with 1153 units (9,1%) and Jerusalem with 1093 
units (8,6%). On the third level two governorates: Tulkarm with 840 units 
(6,6%) and Qualqiliya with 607 (4,85). The governorates less industrialized 
are 3: Salfit with 400 units (3,2%); Tubas with 167 units (1,3%) and Jericho 
with 103 units (0,8%). It is clear how the industrial activities are located in 
the governorates more populated and with the biggest cities, for reasons 
related with human resources proximity and access to the domestic market 
(this demographic effect is clear as the largest proportion of the population 
is located in Hebron). And the less populated governorates even if nearest 
from relevant markets in Israel (from cities as Tayibe, Netanya, Qalansawe, 
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Hadera, Al-Ludd,Tel Aviv) or Jordanian (from cities as Al-Shounah,Salt, 
Jerash, Madaba) are not so interesting for the West Bank industrial 
entrepreneurs, which is a clear sign of the remarkable and intense border 
effect (Al-Ardda, 2000) in West Bank territory.
Figure 6. Geographical distribution of West Bank industrial firms, by 
governorate - 2012
Source: author’s elaboration with data from PCBS (2013-a)
The number of workers in the industrial sector has increased from 38,487 
in 2004 to 56,213 in 2012, which represents a growth rate of 46% for a period 
of 8 years. In spite of the stabilization of the political situation in this phase 
and the growth in the industrial employment, it is important to realize that 
the huge growth rate of industrial workers is explained mainly because the 
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absolute number of industrial workers was too low in 2004 as the industrial 
sector was seriously destroyed at the end of the Second Intifada. In fact, the 
absolute number of industrial workers have increases but the proportion of 
the industrial employment continue in a declining trend, from 12,7% in 2004 
to reach 10.4% in 2014 (PCBS, 2015-b). Palestinian workers were directed 
during these years mainly to the services activities, or to work in Israel 
and/or in the Israeli colonies, so, they were not available to be enrolled in 
the West Bank activities (the proportion of Palestinians working in Israel 
or Israelli colonies increased from10.7% in 2004 to 16.1% in 2014) (PCBS, 
2015-b).
It can be stated that the resurgence of the industrial sector during this 
phase (in number of factories and employment) has been not so dynamic 
as it was desired/needed to contribute to revitalize the West Bank economy. 
In fact, not only the proportion of employment in the industry has declined 
(even in spite the labour force is still an important production factor to the 
most common manufacturing activities in West Bank), but it also happened 
a decline in the percentage of the industrial sector contribution to the West 
Bank GDP and GVA (gross value added). According to PCBS (2015-b) the 
industrial sector contributed with 47% for the Palestinian GDP in 2004 and 
dropped to reach 37.5% in 2014, also the proportion of the industrial sector 
contribution in the gross value added decreased from 37.5% in 2004 to 
25.9% in 2014.
Regarding the West Bank industry structure in terms of the firm’s size, it 
is important to realize that according to the Palestinian Ministry of Industry 
definition (Council of Ministers - PNA, 2011), those factories with 1-4 
employees are considered micro-sized, with 5-9 employees are considered 
small-sized, with 10-19 workers are considered medium-sized, while 
those with more than 20 workers are considered large-sized. So, there is 
a discrepancy between this definition and the one used in most developed 
countries, for instance in the European Union (EU) where a firm with 49 
workers is considered a small sized firm (Surani, 2006), while in Palestine 
3332
Period 2016-An Evaluation of the Role of Oslo Accords in the West Bank Industry: an Economic Analysis of the 19942019 ناريزح )1( ددعلا )4( دلجملا ثاحبلأل للاقتسلاا ةعماج ةلجم
is considered a large sized firm, which makes it difficult to compare the 
statistics regarding their industrial activity structures. 
According to PCBS (2013-a) the industrial sector in the West Bank is 
characterized by the clear dominance of micro-sized firms, as in 2012 more 
than ¾ of all factories employed only 1 to 4 workers. And if we also consider 
those with 59- workers (small sized) the proportion rises to 92%. So, the 
West Bank industry structure is almost composed by small and micro-sized 
companies (in the EU definition those 92% of firms would be all considered 
micro enterprises, as micro enterprises in the EU are those with 1 to 9 
employees). Less than 350 firms have more than 20 workers, so the large 
sized firms are just 2,7% of all West Bank factories. Bethlehem is the West 
Bank governorate where it is observed a slightly higher proportion of larger 
firms, but even so a minority.
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
The First Intifada lasted for six years and ended with the signing of the 
Oslo Accords in 1993, a peace-treaty promoted by the United Nations, which 
created the political conditions to the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority (Meckla, 2014). However, Israel continued to control and occupy 
the Palestinian lands and refused to discuss the nature and competences of 
the Palestinian Authority, the fate of Israeli colonies inside West Bank, the 
status of Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian refugees to return, the refugee’s 
compensation and the water usage  (Beinin, 1999). Years of peace talks have 
failed to produce any resolutions to these issues and in 2000, the Second 
Intifada began, and as a result Israel built a long wall, which has isolated 
the West Bank. Palestinians became surrounded by the wall from all sides, 
moreover several Israeli checkpoints were created that cut off towns and 
villages in the West Bank in order to impose control directly on the ground, 
in terms of preventing movements of citizens and goods. Consequently, the 
wall and the checkpoints have been promoting the destruction of economic 
and social life in several ways, for instance, preventing the access of 
farmers to their lands; narrowing the ability to citizens to move, creating 
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obstacles to the transport of raw materials and manufacturing goods as 
well as agricultural products.  
So, almost 25 years after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, 
the weakness of the West Bank industrial sector is in part a consequence 
of external forces, namely all the limitations imposed by Israel on the 
control of the Palestinian territory, previously discussed and summarized 
by Aburaida (2017).  Between those it is possible to emphasize the negative 
consequences that came from the Palestinian Authority lack of control over 
its external and internal borders, namely obstacles in the raw materials 
importation (difficulties from high importation taxes for the use of Israel 
ports and harbours) or obstacles to sell West Bank goods in local and 
foreign markets (difficulties caused by the Israeli checkpoints as well as 
by the Standards Institution of Israel -SII-which impose high standards 
specifications on the Palestinian products in order for them to be accepted 
in Israel or to be exported to the international markets). The continuous 
insecurity and political instability are other source of obstacles to local 
firms, as the achievements that resulted from the Oslo Accords did not end 
the local unstable context between Israel and Palestine, which affected 
negatively the West Bank economy. In fact, societies with a strong military 
presence by an external force are societies with a future uncertain and 
ambiguous, less trustful and consequently less attractive to investments 
(domestic and foreigners).Unfair competition affecting West Bank goods is 
also a main obstacle to local firms, which was mainly caused by the Paris 
Economic Protocol that gave the opportunity for the Israeli products to 
invade the Palestinian market at the same time it prevents the Palestinian 
products from entering the Israeli market. Finally, and still about obstacles 
originated by the influence of the Israel occupation, it is important to 
mention some adversities and limitations in the use of local infrastructures. 
West Bank firms face several difficulties in the use of local infrastructures, 
which is specially felt in two domains: roads accessibility; and supplying 
infrastructures (access to water or electricity).
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The negative influence of those obstacles was not constant over these 
almost 25 years, a period where globally the Palestinian economy has 
become less diversified, and clearly based at the service sectors, as a 
consequence of an employment decrease in the primary and secondary 
sectors. Immediately after the Oslo Accords the most relevant manufacturing 
activities were concentrated in Nablus governorate and were related with 
metal products, food industry and clothing/textiles goods. During this 
first phase the industrial sector has witnessed a rapid development in the 
West Bank, as a consequence of several plans, programs and laws set up 
by the Palestinian Authority. As a result of all those policies, the industrial 
sector’s contribution to GDP(gross domestic product) increased from 8% in 
1993 to 16.8% in 1998. Moreover, according to PCBS (2000) the industrial 
employment increased in absolute values between 1994 and 2000. However, 
and despite the positive evolution of this first phase, some constraints avoid 
a better performance of the West Bank industrial sector, namely the high 
dependence of the local market and the difficulties to conquest external 
markets (MAS, 2001), which is mostly a consequence of the ‘Paris Economic 
Protocol’ signed in 1994, that created an unfair competition for the West 
Bank goods. Paris Economic Protocol gave the opportunity for the Israeli 
products to invade the Palestinian market at the same time it prevented 
many of the Palestinian products from entering the Israeli market.  Besides, 
the Paris Economic Protocol increased raw material prices with higher 
customs on raw materials imported from Israel and from other countries, 
which had a negative impact on the local industrial competitiveness.
With the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, the West Bank 
industry started to face more difficult conditions in selling their products 
in foreign markets (a complete isolation was imposed by Israel to West 
Bank and Gaza Strip) but also in the domestic market (consequence of the 
Israeli checkpoints between towns and villages). Furthermore, the invasion 
of the West Bank in 2002 resulted in the destruction of many factories (in 
pretext of security reasons). It was observed the destruction, by offensive 
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and devasting attacks, of more than 30% of the Palestinian factories during 
the Israeli invasion of 2002, which has also caused partial damages on 
about 30% of the West Bank factories, causing the suspension (permanent 
or temporarily) of 60% of the Palestinian industrial activities.Consequently, 
during the period correspondent with the Second Intifada, the number 
of industrial firms decreased from 11,509 in 2000 to 9,444 in 2004.This 
decreasing trend was accompanied by the declining in the total the number 
of workers in industrial activities, as it was registered during the Al-Aqsa 
Intifada a decrease in the number of workers in the industrial sector, from 
46755 in 2000 to 38487 in 2004. Moreover, World Bank (2003) indicated that 
in the first two years of the Intifada, the Palestinian economy loss reached 
7% of GDP, just from the effects caused in the industrial facilities that were 
operating before the attacks.
After the end of Second Intifada, the number of industrial factories 
increased again, from 9444 in 2004 to 12657 in 2012, reversing the downward 
trend of the previous phase. In terms of its geographical distribution, the 
West Bank manufacturing activities is now mainly concentrated in Hebron 
in the south, where the number of factories reached 3033, which represents 
almost ¼ (24%) of all West Bank industries.In spite of the stabilization of the 
political situation in this phase and the growth of the industrial employment, 
it is important to realize that the proportion of the industrial employment 
continue in a declining trend, from 12,7% in 2004 to reach 10.4% in 2014 
(PCBS, 2015-b). It was also observed a decline in the percentage of the 
industrial sector contribution to the West Bank GDP and GVA (gross value 
added). According to PCBS (2015-b) the industrial sector contributed with 
47% for the Palestinian GDP in 2004 and dropped to reach 37.5% in 2014. 
So, it can be stated that the resurgence of the industrial sector during this 
third phase has been not so dynamic as it was desired/needed to contribute 
to revitalize the West Bank economy. This trend is above all a consequence 
of all limitations imposed by Israel to the West Bank industry, despite the 
Oslo Accords, namely all those that created an unfair competition to the 
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West Bank goods. In terms of recommendations it is important to emphasize 
that this unique and specific occupation framework and all the obstacles it 
brings to the West Bank industry, justifies the debate about the pertinence 
of some protectionist measures to be taken the Palestinian Authority to 
preserve and reinforce the competitiveness of West Bank industrial goods, 
such as:
1. Encourage local investments (including small projects) through tax 
exemptions, loans and financial facilities, which will reflect on the 
quality of products and will make them capable of competing with the 
products of the Israeli colonies, as well as foreign goods;
2. Impose higher tariffs on imported goods and a better control of the 
products that enter the Palestinian markets (especially the ones that 
are locally available), in order to protect the local production;
3. Revise the Paris Economic Protocol, under the supervision of UN 
economists, and establish economic relations with Israel on a new 
basis, for instance based on political negotiations with Israel aiming 
the creation of a common joint ‘domestic’ market integrating both 
Israel and West Bank, to be an open market explored simultaneously 
and in a fair way by Israeli and West Bank firms.;
4. Restore the consumer confidence in local products and reinforce the 
awareness of the West Bank community for the importance of buying 
Palestinian products, with a communication strategy that could involve 
several methods as advertising measures (including social media);
5. Reinforce the commitment with the campaign of boycott to Israeli 
colonies goods, systematically in all governorates, activating deterrent 
laws against the suppliers and importers of the Israeli colonies goods.
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